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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications are being
used to predict and assess behaviour in multiple
domains which directly affect human well-being.
However, if AI is to improve people’s lives, then
people must be able to trust it, by being able to un-
derstand what the system is doing and why. Al-
though transparency is often seen as the require-
ment in this case, realistically it might not always
be possible, whereas the need to ensure that the sys-
tem operates within set moral bounds remains.
In this paper, we present an approach to evaluate
the moral bounds of an AI system based on the
monitoring of its inputs and outputs. We place a
‘Glass-Box’ around the system by mapping moral
values into explicit verifiable norms that constrain
inputs and outputs, in such a way that if these re-
main within the box we can guarantee that the sys-
tem adheres to the value. The focus on inputs and
outputs allows for the verification and comparison
of vastly different intelligent systems; from deep
neural networks to agent-based systems.
The explicit transformation of abstract moral val-
ues into concrete norms brings great benefits in
terms of explainability; stakeholders know exactly
how the system is interpreting and employing rel-
evant abstract moral human values and calibrate
their trust accordingly. Moreover, by operating at
a higher level we can check the compliance of the
system with different interpretations of the same
value.
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to greatly im-
prove our autonomy and wellbeing, but to be able to interact
with it effectively and safely, we need to be able to trust it. For
example, automatic elevators were fully developed as early as
in 1900. Yet, most people at the time were too uncomfortable
to ride in them, citing safety concerns and support for eleva-
tor operators. It took a strike in 1945, which left New York
paralysed, and a huge industry-led PR push in the early 50s
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to change people’s minds. At the same time, the American
National Standards Institute updated the Safety Code for Ele-
vators first issuance, later to be known as standard A17.1, to
establish minimum-safety requirements.
As this example shows, building public trust in robotics
and artificial intelligence at large requires a multi-faceted ap-
proach: it is both a societal challenge and a technical one.
Trust in the technology we use is a requirement for well-being
and in itself requires governance mechanisms that enable us
to understand —or at least audit— our systems to ensure
compliance [Bryson and Winfield, 2017]. As such, it is be-
coming increasingly important to be able to verify whether in-
telligent systems comply with existing legal frameworks and,
even further, to understand how the system is interpreting and
employing relevant human values and moral principles. I.e.
what does it mean for an AI system to be fair? How is fairness
implemented into the system and does it satisfy the relevant
legal framework? How can we compare two different systems
in terms of their fairness quality?
Trust in AI is often linked to algorithmic transparency,
however, transparency is more than just ensuring algorithm
visibility [Theodorou et al., 2017]. By transparency we mean
that the different factors that influence the decisions made
by algorithms should be visible, or transparent, to the peo-
ple who use, regulate, and are impacted by systems that em-
ploy those algorithms, i.e. the understandability of a specific
model [Lepri et al., 2018]. Transparency is also seen as the,
and is often taken as, a requisite for algorithmic accountabil-
ity [Bryson and Winfield, 2017]. However, decisions made
by predictive algorithms can be opaque because of many fac-
tors, which may not always be possible or desirable to elim-
inate. These include technical (the algorithm may not lend
itself to easy explanation), economic (the cost of providing
transparency may be excessive, including the compromise of
trade secrets), and social (revealing input may violate privacy
expectations)1 [Ananny and Crawford, 2018]. Since human
decisions can also be quite opaque, as are the decisions made
by corporations and organisations, mechanisms such as au-
dits, contracts, and monitoring are in place to regulate and
ensure attribution of accountability. In this paper, we investi-
gate the possibility of applying this type of approaches with
1ACM statement on transparency: http://www.acm.org/binaries/
content/assets/public-policy/2017 usacm statement algorithms.pdf
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the aim to realise trustworthy AI systems that can contribute
to human well-being.
Ultimately, building trustworthy AI requires a focus on
three core principles: responsibility, accountability, and
transparency [Dignum, 2017]. Each one is necessary but not
sufficient to achieve Trustworthy AI. Transparency does not
imply accountability nor responsibility but complements and
extends these. The goal of transparency is providing suffi-
cient information to ensure at least safe usage and human ac-
countability [Bryson and Theodorou, 2019]. For this, there
is a need to at least be able to validate and verify the system
for auditing purposes, a sine qua non to ensure compliance
with any legal or ethical principles a system is required (or
meant to) follow. However, validation and verification pro-
cedures are highly dependant on the legislation and ethical
framework that the system is deployed on, and depend on the
specific contextual interpretations that have been employed
to ground abstract principles (e.g. fairness or privacy) into
concrete system functionalities.
In this paper, we describe the Glass-Box approach, a two-
stage methodology which takes into account the contextual
interpretations of abstract principles taking a Design for Val-
ues perspective [van den Hoven, 2005; Van de Poel, 2013]
and allows for the validation of systems by circulating around
the challenges presented by black boxes. By mapping moral
values into explicit verifiable norms that constrain and direct
inputs and outputs, we place a ‘Glass-Box’ around the sys-
tem in such a way that if these remain within the box we may
say that the system adheres to the value in a specific context.
To produce such a mapping it is necessary in a first interpre-
tation stage to make explicit design decisions concerning the
meaning of values in different legislative and ethical frame-
works, subsuming them into progressively more fine-grained
norms and finally into specific functionalities concerning the
inputs and outputs of the system. The second stage consists
of observing the behaviour of the system (by means of for-
mal verification, simulation, or monitoring) and checking for
its adherence to the low-level requirements on inputs and out-
puts specified in the interpretation stage. Depending on which
of these requirements are met, we are able to say in which
context the system can be considered to adhere to a value.
The explicitness in the interpretation of values allows
stakeholders to know exactly what it means for a system to
adhere to a certain value, and thus to calibrate their trust ac-
cordingly. Furthermore, the system can include its adher-
ence to a value as an explanation for its actions [Cranefield
et al., 2017]. Design for Values is made easier, as it is a mat-
ter of implementing the right Glass-Box with the appropriate
norms. The focus on inputs and outputs allows for the verifi-
cation and comparison of vastly different intelligent systems,
from neural networks to agent based systems. Moreover, the
versatility of our approach allows us to check the compliance
of the system with different interpretations of the same value.
This compliance checking is not only considered a minimum-
level transparency for a deployed system, but also necessary
to ensure the due diligence of a system and, therefore, enforce
attribution of legal or ethical accountability if needed [Bryson
and Winfield, 2017].
First, we discuss our motivation and need to Design for
Values. Next, we present to the reader our Glass-Box ap-
proach. In the penultimate section we provide an example of
how our approach can be applied to a real-world intelligent
system. We conclude the paper with a discussion and conclu-
sions of the work presented.
2 Responsible Artificial Intelligence
In all areas of application, where AI is applied to make de-
cisions that affect people and society, the most important is-
sue to consider is perhaps the need to rethink responsibility
[Dignum, 2017]. Responsible Artificial Intelligence is about
human responsibility for the development of intelligent sys-
tems along fundamental human principles and values, to en-
sure human flourishing and well-being in a sustainable world.
That is, AI reasoning should be able to take into account
societal values, moral and ethical considerations; weigh the
respective priorities of values held by different stakeholders
in various multicultural contexts; explain its reasoning; and
guarantee transparency. Responsible AI is more than the tick-
ing of some ethical ‘boxes’ in a report, or the development
of some add-on features, or switch-off buttons in AI systems.
Rather, responsibility is fundamental to autonomy and should
be one of the core stances underlying AI research. Ethical and
social requirements for responsible AI can be classified into
three areas [Dignum, 2018]:
• Ethics by Design: the technical/algorithmic integration
of ethical reasoning capabilities as part of the behaviour
of artificial autonomous system;
• Ethics in Design: the regulatory and engineering meth-
ods that support the analysis and evaluation of the ethical
implications of AI systems as these integrate or replace
traditional social structures;
• Ethics for Design: the codes of conduct, standards and
certification processes that ensure the integrity of devel-
opers and users as they research, design, construct, em-
ploy and manage artificial intelligent systems.
Many organisations and nations have produced, or are in the
process of announcing, statements on the values or princi-
ples that should guide the development and deployment of AI
in society2. The current emphasis on the delivery of high-
level statements on AI ethics may also bring with it the risk
of implicitly setting the ‘moral background’ for conversation
about ethics and technology [Greene et al., 2019] as being
about abstract principles. Often these statements lack precise
normative frameworks that can enable the understanding of
how ethical values are interpreted and implemented in con-
crete applications. Moreover, there is not a one-to-one link
between values and actions/functionalities. In general, every
action will contribute to more than one value, either positively
or negatively, while systems need to balance between differ-
ent values.
Ensuring socially beneficial outcomes of AI relies on re-
solving the tension between incorporating the benefits and
2These include but are not limited to: the United Nations, the
European Union, UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council, ACM, and IEEE Standards Association.
mitigating the potential harms of AI. In short, simultane-
ously avoiding the misuse and underuse of these technologies
[Floridi et al., 2018]. Needless to say that compliance with
the law is always a fundamental requirement of any system,
but it is also significantly insufficient. In fact, compliance
with the law is the minimum that should be ensured but an
ethical approach goes further than legal compliance [Floridi,
2018].
Values and principles are dependent on the socio-cultural
context [Turiel, 2002]; they are often only implicit in deliber-
ation processes. Theories and methods are needed that elicit
and integrate societal, legal and moral values into all stages
of development (analysis, design, construction, deployment
and evaluation) of any intelligent system. Design for Values
methodologies [Friedman et al., 2006; van den Hoven, 2005]
provide rational procedures for designing artefacts under the
guidance of moral values. During the development of AI sys-
tems, taking a Design for Values approach means that the pro-
cess needs to include explicit activities for [Aldewereld et al.,
2014]: (i) the identification of societal values, (ii) deciding on
a moral deliberation approach (e.g. through algorithms, user
control or regulation), and (iii) link values to formal system
requirements and concrete functionalities [Aldewereld et al.,
2010].
For example, consider the development of an intelligent
recruitment application. A value that can be assumed for
this system is fairness. However, fairness can have different
normative interpretations, such as equal access to resources,
or equal opportunities, which can lead to very different ac-
tions. It is, therefore, necessary to make explicit which in-
terpretation(s) is taken into the design. This decision may
be informed by domain requirements and regulations, e.g. a
choice for equal opportunities meets the legal requirement es-
tablished in national law. Finally, we still need to be explicit
about how this norm is implemented in the system, which de-
pends on the context but is also influenced by the personal
views and cultural background of those deciding on the in-
terpretation. Machine learning literature identifies different
functional interpretations of the equal opportunities view of
fairness, e.g. demographic parity [Pedreschi et al., 2008] and
equal odds [Dwork et al., 2012] amongst others. The Design
for Values approach makes these choices explicit and sup-
ports formal verification.
3 Glass-Box Approach
In this section, we provide a sketch of the Glass-Box ap-
proach, as depicted in Figure 1. The approach includes two
phases:
• Interpretation stage: the explicit and structured process
of translating values into design requirements. This is
a bi-directional relation, where a top-down counts-as
specification relation describes the translations of higher
level elements into lower level, contextualised, concepts;
and a for-the-sake-of relation connects lower level el-
ements, such design requirements to higher level ele-
ments, such as more general norms and values [Van de
Poel, 2013]. Interpretation decisions define the way sys-
tems are ultimately built. In this sense, they can be seen
as Searle’s constituitive rules [Searle, 1995].
• Observation stage: based on the functionalities specified
in the Interpretation phase, we can observe and qualify
the behaviour of the AI application. In this stage compli-
ance with the values is approximated to the evaluation of
the system with respect to the requirements specified in
the interpretation stage. Different methods can be used
including formal verification, simulation or monitoring.
In the the rest of this section, we describe these stages in
more detail.
3.1 Interpretation Stage
The first step of the interpretation stage entails a transla-
tion from abstract values into concrete norms comprehensive
enough so that fulfilling the norm will be considered as ad-
hering to the value. Following a Design for Values approach
(see section 2), a shift from abstract to concrete necessarily
involves careful consideration of context. Normative systems
are often described in deontic-based languages, which allow
for the representation of obligations, permissions and prohi-
bitions. In the Glass-Box Approach however, we aim to not
only describe the norms themselves, but also the exact con-
textual connection between abstract and concrete concepts.
Several authors have proposed counts-as statements as a
means to formalise interpretations [Aldewereld et al., 2010].
With this relation, we can build logical statements of the
form: “X counts as Y in context C” [Searle, 1995; Jones and
Sergot, 1995]. Counts-as is a contextual subsumption rela-
tion that describes the translations of higher level elements
into lower level, contextualised, concepts.
The counts-as operator admits formalisations based in
modal logic [Jones and Sergot, 1995; Grossi et al., 2006b]
and description logic [Grossi et al., 2006a] and thus it lends
itself to implementations [Aldewereld et al., 2010]. Further-
more, the interactions of counts-as relations operating in dif-
ferent contexts may be formalised as well [Grossi, 2007].
With this approach we can formally represent the explicit re-
lations between abstract and concrete concepts, and, given
that the relations between concepts are dependent on the con-
text in which that relation is evaluated, the definition of the
context of those relations is made explicit as well. In this
formalisation, the conjunctions and disjunctions of different
norms will therefore stand for the explicit interpretation of a
value in a specific, explicit context.
The second step in the interpretation stage is the concretisa-
tion of norms into specific system requirements. In the Glass-
Box approach these requirements will be given in terms of the
inputs and outputs of the intelligent system. The connection
of these lower level requirements to higher level elements can
be described in terms of a for-the-sake-of relation [Van de
Poel, 2013]. This relation would allow for the formalisation
of statements of the form “X is done for the sake of Y”.
As a simple example which we expand in the next section,
consider a system advising on the attribution of mortgages.
We wish for the value privacy to be implemented in the sys-
tem, taking into account different perspectives. At the end
of the interpretation stage, after discussion with stakeholders,
we may arrive at a norm postulating that from the point of
interpretation
stage
values
norms
requirements
observation
stage
systeminput output
Figure 1: The two stages of the Glass-Box Approach: an Interpretation stage, where values are translated into design requirements, and an
Observation stage, where we can observe and qualify the behaviour of the system.
view of the customer, revealing only the personal informa-
tion available to the tax agency counts as respecting the value
of privacy. Then, this norm can be distilled into a function-
ality by ensuring that only this type of data is entered into
the system. Other perspectives and values are then similarly
concretised and translated into functionalities.
At the end of the interpretation stage we will therefore have
built an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy of norms where the
highest level is made-up of values and the lowest level is com-
posed of fine-grained concrete requirements for the intelligent
system only related to its inputs and outputs. The intermedi-
ate levels are composed of progressively more abstract norms,
and the connections between nodes on each level are contex-
tual. The concrete requirements inform the observation stage
of our approach, as they indicate what must be verified and
checked. On the other hand, this hierarchy can be used after
the observation stage to provide high-level transparency for a
deployed system: depending on which requirements are be-
ing fulfilled, we can provide explanations for how and exactly
in which context the system adheres to a value.
3.2 Observation Stage
As result of the previous stage, the list of requirements that
provides an interpretation of the desirable ethical principles
has been identified. In this stage, the behaviour of the system
is evaluated with respect to the values by studying its com-
pliance with these requirements. In [Va´zquez-Salceda et al.,
2007] two requirements for norms to be enforceable are iden-
tified: verifiability i.e. the low-level norms must allow for
being machine-verified given the time and resources needed,
and computational tractability, i.e. whether the functionali-
ties comply with the norms can be checked on any moment
in a fast, low cost way. Note that this is a requirement for the
observation stage and not necessarily for the design stage!
Hence, some of the norms chosen for the design stage might
be easily implementable, but hard to monitor. For example, a
neural network approach to implement a mortgage decision,
in which the neural net is trained on all decisions of the last
years can provide an implementation not to deviate from de-
cisions in similar cases. However, it is not easy to monitor
or govern that the decisions never deviate more than a certain
percentage from similar cases.
In order to ensure that the Glass-Box approach is enforce-
able, governance mechanisms that include the specification
of quality of service levels. As an example that we will elab-
orate in the next section, a minimum ‘fairness-quality’ level
for a mortgage-decision system, may be to guarantee that e.g.
anyone who requests a mortgage of less than 30% of his/her
liquid loan should be granted it. More refined quality lev-
els include the guarantee that all similar applicants receive
the same treatment. Observing these levels poses different
constraints to the Glass-Box framework: whereas for the for-
mer only the behaviour with respect to one given applicant is
needed, the latter is dependent of data about many applicants
within a given time frame and region.
The mechanisms to observe this behaviour can be imple-
mented without knowledge about the internal workings of
the system under observation, by monitoring input and out-
put streams. We insist on this feature as we do not always
have access to the internals of the system, neither do we al-
ways have access to the designs of a system. Either way,
the main challenge is the computational tractability of these
checks on the design requirements and their implementation,
and the fact that systems, and values and norms, evolve. Part
of the challenge is then on determining the required granular-
ity of the Glass-Box: a too rough approximation will possi-
bly cap many potentially compliant behaviours, whereas a too
specific Glass-Box may limit the adaptation of the AI system.
Given that we have designed the system using the value-
based design method sketched in this section it is possible to
use the norms from the design stage to derive suitable norms
for the observation stage. However, if these design stage
norms are not available we have to design them based on the
general requirements of the system taking into account a bal-
ance between enforceability and effectivity. Still, another is-
sue comes up in this stage, which is that we might want the
system to comply to given external regulations, such as the
regulation on fair treatment of customers in the national law.
4 Use Case
Let us consider a system that decides on mortgages as an ex-
ample. The starting point is to check what fair means in the
Figure 2: Hierarchy of norms and values identified at the interpretation stage. Blue arrows represent counts-as relationships.
context of mortgage decisions. The general idea of fairness is
that costs and benefits are divided in a way that is acceptable
for all stakeholders. In this example there are at least three
ways to view this. The decision should be fair between the
bank and the customer; e.g. the bank should not have to take
a high risk of losing the money and the customer should get a
mortgage if she can afford it. The decision should also be fair
between customers; e.g. two customers in comparable situa-
tions should get the same decision and if their situations are
different, then it should be clear how this influences the deci-
sion. Finally, the decision should also remain fair over time;
for example, a bank should not drastically change its policy
from one day to another without prior warning.
For each of the perspectives of fairness above we can check
which norms might support the value of fairness. For the bank
a norm could be to give a mortgage if the amount of the mort-
gage is less than 70% of the execution value of the property.
In that case the bank can still sell the property and after deduc-
ing costs and still recover all of its money if the customer fails
to pay. Another norm would be that if the monthly payments
of the mortgage are less than 30% of the expected income
of the customer the mortgage is affordable and thus should
be awarded. Many more norms could of course be given to
define in more detail what a bank is considering to be a risk
and what a customer is considering to be affordable. We do
not argue that these exact norms are the best ones to use, but
rather that with our approach any norms that we choose are
explicitly coupled to a perspective of fairness.
Similarly, we can create norms to guarantee fairness be-
tween customers. In this perspective, norms will define what
it means that customers are in a similar situation and should
get a similar decision. For example, it can be decided that
customers in the same 5 year age bracket and incomes not
differing more than $100 per month should get the same de-
cision on loans that do not differ more than $5000. One can
easily see that here is the point where biases come in: indeed,
the criteria that are used to determine whether customers are
in similar situations can greatly bias the decision. Do we only
check the income of the customer for the next year or do we
want an expected income for the next 10 years? The latter
would favor tenured staff as temporary staff cannot guarantee
an income after two years or so. Again, we do not claim that
this is the only interpretation of fairness for this scenario, but
rather we want to illustrate that for each value there are mul-
tiple perspectives and their importance also differs depending
on the stakeholder.
In order to make ‘better’ decisions on the loan, the bank
can argue that it should look at more factors than just current
income; e.g. the personal life of the customer. However, that
may violate the privacy of the customer —another value that
needs to be respected. What if at the time of the application
a couple has enough income to get a loan according to the
norms, but they are expecting a child and they are planning
to switch to part-time work after the baby is born? Such a
move could reduce their income to just 75% of their current
one. One could argue that it would be ‘fair’ not to withhold
this information from the bank at the time of the loan applica-
tion. However, one can also argue that this is private informa-
tion and that many things can occur before the baby is born
and, thus, they should not be obliged to tell the bank anything
about these plans. Another norm could be to oblige the cus-
tomers to give all information to the bank that they also give
to their country’s tax agency, but nothing more. This could
be a balanced compromise between revealing private infor-
mation and providing sufficient financial information. Again,
how far this solution is the best possible norm is subject to
debate. The important point here is that this norm is con-
stituted exactly for the purpose of balancing between these
two values in this context. If customers would prefer not to
give that much information they might find another bank that
gives more priority to customer privacy, but then is more con-
servative in giving loans as the uncertainty —and, hence, the
risk— is higher. Thus, different values can steer behaviour in
different directions. After the norm identification process, we
obtain a hierarchy of norms and values illustrated in Figure 2
The last step of interpretation is from norms to functional-
ities. In our example this means that the bank could employ
some AI system to calculate the possible decisions on mort-
gage requests. This system should comply with the norms,
but can still have considerable room to optimise the decisions.
For example, it can still give customers a loan even if they get
a monthly instalment higher than 30% of their income: the
norm only forbids refusing on the basis of this criteria, but
if the customer has a very high income it might be that the
income left after paying the monthly instalment is still very
high and enough to warrant the risk. The decisions presented
here are a kind of rule based system, we could also consider
a neural network that is trained on existing customer data and
the constraints given by the norms. Furthermore, a decision
on a mortgage is not just a yes/no decision, but can vary in
the interest requested on the loan.
The above indicates how values can be implemented in a
system. The verification of compliance is a separate, but re-
lated, case. Given the issues raised in the previous section on
norm verification, we need to consider the impact of the out-
come of the system on the users, the dynamics of the context,
the continuity of the output values as related to the input pa-
rameters and the efficiency and tractability of the verification.
If the bank uses the 30% norm it is easy to check and thus
cost effective, efficient and will be fair between customers
and over time. However, if more fine grained fairness is re-
quired and not only the decision between getting a mortgage
or not, but also the interest rate should be fair, the scenario be-
comes far more complex. In this case the Glass-Box is fitted
quite tight around the implemented system and thus needs to
be formulated in a way to give room for flexibility and adap-
tiveness of the system, but at the same time guarantee the
value of fairness. A Glass-Box defined such that an interest
rate on a mortgage can never be more than 1,5*central bank
interest may work well in ”usual” circumstances, but is very
difficult to maintain if the interest of the central bank goes
to zero. On the other hand, a Glass-Box with an interest rate
that is calculated by simply adding 2 to the interest of the cen-
tral bank might be too loose and not guarantee much fairness.
A different formulation where the fairness of the decisions
is taken more literally and each decision is compared to all
other decisions the bank has made until that point has its own
flaws: it becomes very inefficient (considering that one has to
first determine ‘similarity’ between customers and their situa-
tion). From the above it can be seen that by using the different
layers of modelling it is possible to guarantee the compliance
to certain values (and priorities between values).
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Achieving trustworthy AI systems is a multifaceted complex
process, which requires both technical and socio-legal initia-
tives and solutions to ensure that we always align an intelli-
gent system’s goals with human values. Core values, as well
as the processes used for value elicitation, must be made ex-
plicit and that all stakeholders are involved in this process.
Furthermore, the methods used for the elicitation processes
and the decisions of who is involved in the value identifica-
tion process are clearly identified and documented. Similarly,
all design decisions and options must also be explicitly re-
ported; linking system features to the social norms and val-
ues that motivate or are affected by them. This not unlike
to how software developers in regulated industries already
have to map new features and bug reports to code changes
for ISO9001 accreditation [ISO, 2015]. This should always
be done in ways that provide inspection capabilities —and,
hence, traceability— for code and data sources to ensure that
data provenance is open and fair.
The focus on inputs and outputs allows for the verification
and comparison of vastly different intelligent systems, from
neural networks to agent based systems. Moreover, the versa-
tility of our approach allows us to check the compliance of the
system against different interpretations of the same value, e.g.
the American interpretation of ‘fair use’ for data handling is
different compare to the one set by the EU. Furthermore, the
system can include its adherence to a value as an explanation
for its actions, providing a high-level transparency necessary
to ensure the due diligence of a system.
The Glass-Box approach opens interesting avenues for
follow-up research. The development of a formalism to ex-
press concrete input/output requirements would be an in-
teresting first step. Furthermore, such a formalism could
be linked to formal verification procedures. In addition,
although the mechanisms for describing the connections
between requirements and norms and between norms and
values are outlined in this paper, further insight may be
gained through the development of an all encompassing
requirement-to-value formalism that would allow for the de-
scription of the full hierarchy of concepts. On the other hand,
given a Glass-Box, it would be interesting to study whether
the systems that fulfil its requirements can be characterised.
Last, technical implementations of concrete Glass-Boxes for
a system may be developed.
While we strive to make tools and technologies like our
Glass-Box approach widely available and accepted, we must
ensure legal paths to address by ownership and/or usage our
responsibility and accountability. Otherwise, we may have
the same problem as the one we often have with private-
owned militias; lack of effective responsibility and account-
ability. Governance mechanisms, such as standards and leg-
islation to enforce technical solutions like the Glass-Box, can
ensure that any moral responsibility or legal accountability is
properly appropriated by the relevant stakeholders, together
with the processes that support redressing, mitigation and
evaluation of potential harm, and means to monitor and in-
tervene on the system’s operation. Finally, responsible AI
—and any policy at large—- also requires informed participa-
tion of all stakeholders, which means that education plays an
important role, both to ensure that knowledge of the potential
impact of AI is widespread, as well as to make people aware
that they can participate in shaping societal development.
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